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UNITED STATES V. KIRKALDIE:1 TO RECOGNIZE OR NOT TO 
RECOGNIZE UNCOUNSELED TRIBAL COURT 
CONVICTIONS?  
 
Madison Mattioli 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In February of 2014, a grand jury returned an indictment charging 
William Kirkaldie with domestic abuse by a habitual offender under 18 
U.S.C. § 117(a),2 a federal statute enacted to promote safety for Native 
American women.3 Congress enacted Section 117 to address the issue of 
assault in “Indian Country” by attaching “a federal penalty to the 
commission of a domestic assault when the actor has had at least two 
prior, similar convictions in another jurisdiction.”4 The prior convictions 
can arise from state, federal, or tribal court.5 Kirkaldie pled guilty to two 
prior charges of domestic violence in tribal court without an attorney, 
and had served jail time as part of these prior convictions.6 In granting 
the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, Judge Morris for the 
District Court of Montana held that Kirkaldie’s uncounseled tribal court 
convictions could not be admitted to establish an element of the offense 
under the federal recidivist statute.7  
Kirkaldie’s holding falls in line with Ninth Circuit precedent as 
stated in United States v. Ant,8 and is a correct application of the law in 
this jurisdiction. The District Court came to the right conclusion based on 
the facts and the law presented to it. However, the Supreme Court of 
Montana along with the Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts disagree with 
the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Ant.9 The United States Supreme Court has 
never entertained argument on this precise constitutional issue,10 but 
recent decisions perpetuating a significant Circuit split may require it to 
do so in the near future. Part II of this note summarizes the legal history 
                                         
1
 U.S. v. Kirkaldie, __ F.Supp.2d __, 2014 WL 2119860 (D. Mont. 2014). An exhaustive analysis of 
this decision involves several complicated issues of Federal Indian and Constitutional law, the use of 
collateral attacks upon prior convictions, Congress’s plenary authority to regulate Indian tribes, 
statutory construction, and stare decisis. This short note will only focus on the validity of 
uncounseled tribal court convictions, where actual imprisonment was imposed, being used as 
predicate offenses in recidivist prosecutions.  
2
 Id. at *1. 
3
 Id. at *2.  
4
 Id. 
5
 Id. 
6
 Id. 
7
 Kirkaldie, 2014 WL 2119860 at *8.  
8
 U.S. v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir.1989). 
9
 Kirkaldie, 2014 WL 2119860 at **6–8.  
10
 State v. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239 (Mont. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 1008 (2003); Cavanaugh 
v. U.S., 643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1542, (2012); Shavanaux v. U.S., 647 
F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012). 
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prior to U.S. v. Kirkaldie, Part III explores the differences in reasoning 
among the circuits, Part IV summarizes the opinion in U.S. v. Kirkaldie, 
Part V analyzes the different Circuit approaches to this issue, and Part VI 
concludes the note by exploring possible consequences of the continuing 
Circuit split.  
 
II. HISTORY  
 
A. Ninth Circuit Precedent 
 
Ant is controlling precedent in the Ninth Circuit. Ant was indicted 
and charged with manslaughter in federal court and moved to suppress 
evidence of a prior uncounseled guilty plea in tribal court of assault and 
battery.11 Both the federal prosecution and the tribal court conviction 
arose from the same alleged incident.12 Ant served a sentence of six 
months in jail as a result of the tribal court conviction.13 The issue in Ant 
was whether the uncounseled guilty plea, validly entered in tribal court 
but which would have been unconstitutional if made in federal court, 
could be admitted as evidence of guilt in the subsequent federal 
prosecution involving the same acts.14 Even though Ant’s guilty plea in 
tribal court was entered in accordance with tribal code and the Indian 
Civil Rights Act (ICRA), the Ninth Circuit held that acceptance of the 
guilty plea violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights and was not 
admissible in the federal prosecution.15 The Court based its reasoning in 
part on Baldasar v. Illinois,16 a case which the United States Supreme 
Court explicitly overruled in U.S. v. Nichols.17  
 
B. Supreme Court Precedent  
 
The fractured Court in Baldasar held that an uncounseled 
misdemeanor conviction could not be used under an enhanced penalty 
statute to convert a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony with a prison 
term.18 In Nichols, the Court held that consistent with Sixth Amendment 
doctrine, an uncounseled misdemeanor, valid under Scott v. Illinois19 due 
to absence of incarceration, could be used to enhance punishment at a 
subsequent conviction.20 The Nichols Court concluded that the right to 
                                         
11Ant, 882 F.2d at 1390. 
12Id. 
13
 Id. 
14
 Id. at 1391 (emphasis added).  
15
 Id. at 1396. 
16
 Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980).  
17
 U.S. v. Nichols, 511 U.S. 738 (1994). 
18
 Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 223.  
19
 Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (Holding that actual imprisonment is the bright line test as to 
when the right to counsel attaches under the Sixth Amendment). 
20
 Nichols, 511 U.S. at 738. 
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counsel had not attached because no jail time was imposed in the first 
proceeding.21 Baldasar and Nichols lay the foundation for Ant, yet 
neither case deals specifically with the factual situation presented in Ant 
or Kirkaldie.  
 
III. EIGHTH AND TENTH CIRCUIT REASONING 
 
 The Eighth Circuit ruled on a factual situation almost identical to the 
one posed in Kirkaldie in United States v. Cavanaugh.22 The District 
Court determined that “the introduction of uncounseled tribal court 
convictions in federal court as proof of an essential element of a federal 
crime violate a defendant’s right to counsel and due process.”23 The 
Eighth Circuit reversed however, deeming the Sixth Amendment 
analysis inapplicable.24 In reversing, it reasoned that “the use of prior 
uncounseled tribal court convictions failed to violate the federal 
defendant’s right to counsel because the federal constitutional right to 
appointed counsel did not apply in tribal court.”25 
 A mere twenty days after the decision in Cavanaugh, the Tenth 
Circuit also ruled on the same factual situation in United States v. 
Shavanaux.26 The Tenth Circuit also found the Sixth Amendment 
analysis inapplicable to tribal court proceedings.27 In reversing the 
District Court, it reasoned that based on Talton v. Mayes28 the Bill of 
Rights does not apply to Indian tribes and “[t]hus, rather than being 
subject to the United States Constitution, the tribal exercise of inherent 
power is constrained only by the ‘supreme legislative authority of the 
United States.’”29 The Tenth Circuit claimed that Ant overlooked the 
Talton line of cases, and it “therefore disagree[d] with Ant’s threshold 
determination that an uncounseled tribal court conviction is 
constitutionally infirm.”30  
The Tenth Circuit focused largely on principles of comity and due 
process “to conclude that the uncounseled tribal court convictions failed 
to comply with the constitution, yet simultaneously did not violate the 
Constitution.”31 Absent a due process violation, the principle of comity 
applies and federal courts are required to recognize tribal convictions, 
                                         
21
 Id. 
22
 Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592.  
23
 Id. at 595. 
24
 Id.  
25
 Kirkaldie, 2014 WL 2119860 at *6 (analyzing Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 604–605).   
26
 Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993. 
27
 Id. at 998. 
28
 Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
29
 Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 997 (The Tenth Circuit, citing the holding in Talton, 163 U.S. at 364, 
indicated “Congress has plenary power of Indian affairs and exercised this power by passing 
ICRA.”).  
30
 Id. at 998.  
31
 Id.  
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whether counseled or not.32 This is largely the reasoning of the Montana 
Supreme Court as stated in State v. Spotted Eagle, 33 which the Circuit 
Court opinions note.34 
 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT’S REASONING IN KIRKALDIE  
 
 The Government in Kirkaldie urged the District Court to abandon 
Ant in favor of the reasoning of the other Circuits.35 The District Court 
instead stated that “Ant remains binding law in the Ninth Circuit” and 
“[t]he Court must follow precedent.”36 The court focused its analysis 
upon the fact that Kirkaldie was actually incarcerated as a result of his 
prior tribal court convictions, 37 because under Scott actual imprisonment 
is the bright line test as to when the right to counsel attaches under the 
Sixth Amendment. 38 The court reasoned “the use of evidence obtained 
‘outside the Constitution’ as integral evidence in a federal prosecution 
would violate Kirkaldie’s right ‘to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense.’”39 In following the reasoning down the rabbit hole, the Court 
offered that “[a]n issue of constitutional moment arises when an 
uncounseled tribal court proceeding serves as evidence of a federal 
crime. The statutory lack of counsel in a tribal court proceeding would 
sustain a federal prosecution.”40  
The Court recognized that it was faced with “an unpalatable 
decision: dilute a defendant’s constitutional rights due to the defendant’s 
membership in a sovereign tribal nation; or foreclose the prosecution of 
an alleged habitual domestic violence offender due to the unique 
structure of tribal courts.”41 Recognizing Congress’s “shortcoming” in 
enacting 28 U.S.C. § 117,42 the court nonetheless asserted there are tribes 
that “presently possess the resources to convict defendants in a manner 
that would allow those convictions to be introduced properly as evidence 
in federal court.”43 
 
                                         
32
 Id. at 999.  
33
 Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239. 
34
 Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 999; Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 604. 
35
 Kirkaldie, 2014 WL 2119860 at *14.  
36
 Id. at *13. 
37
 Kirkaldie, supra. n. 6.  
38
 Scott, 440 U.S. at 373–374. 
39
 Kirkaldie, 2014 WL 2119860 at *19.  
40
 Id. at *17.  
41
 Id.  
42
 Through the statute’s explicit allowance for the use of evidence obtained in violation of the 
constitution to fulfill an element of the offense. 
43
 Kirkaldie, 2014 WL 2119860 at **17–18 (The Court also addressed the supplemental jurisdiction 
issue under 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4) which requires that a defendant in tribal court receive all other 
rights whose protection is necessary under the Constitution of the United States, including the right 
to court-appointed counsel.). 
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT ISSUE PRESENTED 
IN KIRKALDIE  
 
The decision reached by the District Court in Kirkaldie is supported 
by the Supreme Court’s holding in Nichols. Kirkaldie was sentenced to 
and actually served six months in jail as a result of his tribal court 
convictions of domestic violence. Nichols’s holding was limited to 
convictions valid under Scott because no imprisonment was imposed.44 
Because Kirkaldie was not represented by counsel and imprisoned those 
convictions were sufficiently unreliable to warrant their use to enhance 
punishment in subsequent proceedings. However, the convictions being 
challenged in both Baldasar and Nichols were challenged for their use at 
sentencing rather than at trial, as was the attempted use in Ant. The 
Eighth Circuit recognized this, and cautioned practitioners in that Circuit 
that Nichols may have limited applicability to convictions being utilized 
in the guilt phase as opposed to at sentencing.45 If Nichols were to apply, 
the issue remains that Kirkaldie’s prior uncounseled conviction arose in 
tribal court where the Sixth Amendment does not apply, as opposed to in 
state or federal court where the Sixth Amendment applies.  
As explored previously, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits decisions 
stand for the proposition that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to 
tribal court proceedings.46 However, “[t]he Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantee of the right to assistance of counsel is plainly not limited to 
citizens, but rather provides protection to the broader category of “the 
accused.’”47 The Supreme Court has even afforded the right to effective 
assistance of counsel to non-citizens48 stating, “[i]t is our responsibility 
under the Constitution to ensure that no criminal defendant—whether a 
citizen or not—is left to the “mercies of incompetent counsel.”49  
An interesting dichotomy emerges as enrolled Native Americans 
enjoy dual-citizenship, and at all times remain citizens of both the United 
States and the sovereign Indian nations. Yet “[t]ribal courts constitute the 
only judicial forum in the United States where the constitutional right to 
counsel does not exist for a United States citizen.”50 The District Court in 
Kirkaldie concluded that the decisions reached in the Eighth and Tenth 
Circuits “fail[ed] to reconcile the unique dual rights that every individual 
Indian holds: the rights of a United States citizen under the United States 
                                         
44
 Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748 (emphasis added).  
45
 Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 601 (recognizing the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the differences 
between the sentencing and guilt determination phases).  
46
 Kirkaldie, 2014 WL 2119860 at **14–15.  
47
 Amicus Curiae Br. of the Const. Accountability Ctr. in Support of Petrs., Chaidez v. U.S., 
http://perma.cc/BH6Y-FZ8V at **2–3 (No. 11-820, 112 S. Ct. 209 (2012)). 
48
 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
49
 Id. at 374.  
50
 Kirkaldie, 2014 WL 2119860 at *10 (analyzing U.S. v. First, 731 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 2013).  
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Constitution, and the distinct rights as a tribal citizen under ICRA.”51 
However, the Tenth Circuit cited Talton, which stands for the proposition 
that "[w]hile Native Americans are citizens of the United States, the 
United States Constitution does not apply to Indian tribes."52  
The Cavanaugh Court, while ultimately disagreeing with the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding in Ant, concluded its opinion by stating that at best, 
“Supreme Court authority in this area is unclear; reasonable decision-
makers may differ in their conclusions as to whether the Sixth 
Amendment precludes a federal court's subsequent use of convictions 
that are valid because and only because they arose in a court where the 
Sixth Amendment did not apply.”53 This statement does not inspire 
confidence that after a thorough review of the record and analysis the 
Eighth Circuit reached the correct legal decision. The Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel exists to ensure the reliability of convictions. Where 
uncounseled convictions can be used to fulfill substantial elements of 
federal crimes, the guarantee of counsel under the Sixth Amendment has 
been violated. This is an admittedly difficult issue to decide because the 
United States Supreme Court has not made it clear what the law is in this 
area.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The arbitrary legal difference between the Circuit approaches to this 
issue can lead to other negative consequences for Native American 
defendants. For example, the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians 
(TMBCI) Reservation sits in Rolette County, North Dakota, which is in 
the Eighth Circuit. However, a large number of off-reservation Turtle 
Mountain trust lands sit in Montana,54 which is in the Ninth Circuit. This 
situation could lead to the same individual committing the same offense 
in North Dakota and Montana being treated entirely differently in federal 
courts sitting in the respective Circuits, which are geographically less 
than 500 miles apart.  
This issue, made difficult because of the unique status of the 
defendant, requires a District Court judge sitting in the Ninth Circuit to 
wrestle with a difficult policy decision. By adhering to precedent, an 
alleged habitual domestic violence offender can walk out of federal court 
unpunished. By abandoning and reversing precedent, a U.S. citizen 
deprived of the right to counsel will have an uncounseled conviction 
used to fulfill an element of a federal offense. The vitality of Ant is 
currently being litigated in Montana in three cases involving the use of 
                                         
51
 Id. at *16 (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI and 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6)).  
52
 Talton, 163 U.S. at 384. 
53
 Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 605 (emphasis added).  
54
 U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Information on Chippewa Indians: 
Turtle Mountain Reservation, http://perma.cc/3YLB-K2UV (accessed Sept. 16, 2014).  
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uncounseled tribal court convictions as predicate offenses under 
§ 117(a),55 and oral argument was heard in the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals sitting in Portland in July of 2014 in United States v. Bryant.56 
The Government continues to urge the Ninth Circuit to overrule Ant, and 
to adopt law similar to that of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits and the 
Montana Supreme Court, while criminal defendants remain adamant that 
the use of uncounseled convictions as evidence in federal court is an 
impermissible Sixth Amendment violation.  
After hearing oral argument in Bryant, the Ninth Circuit will revisit 
its decision in Ant and will likely affirm its vitality. This is an area ripe 
for review by the Supreme Court in order to provide both conformity and 
clarity to an increasingly confusing body of law. It is the job of the 
nation’s highest court to instruct the lower courts on what the law is, and 
they should choose to do so here. Absent a direct ruling from the 
Supreme Court, there is no reason for the Ninth Circuit to abandon 
precedent and adopt the reasoning of other Circuit courts.  
 
 
                                         
55
 U.S. v. Kirkaldie, 2014 WL 2119860 (9th Cir. May 22, 2014); Or. Granting Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss the Indictment, United States v. Stewart, https://ecf.mtd.uscourts.gov/doc1/11111509947 
(D. Mont. May 22, 2014) (CR 14-20-BLG-SPW, available on PACER); Oral Argument Audiofile, 
United States v. Bryant, http://perma.cc/99EC-KFMR (July 10, 2014) (No. 12-30177).  
56
 Oral Argument Audiofile, U.S. v. Bryant, http://perma.cc/99EC-KFMR (July 10, 2014) (No. 12-
30177).  
